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The Andean Community, a regional integration pact among a small group of developing 
countries on the mountainous western edge of South America, entered its fifth decade riven by 
political and economic schisms.  Divisions among the member states have waxed and waned 
over the years, but in general they have prevented the Community from living up to its potential 
as the continent’s second largest trading bloc.  In addition, the Andean Community’s 
supranational institutions—which include a Commission of national executives, a General 
Secretariat of regional administrators, and a Tribunal of Justice (the ATJ or the Andean 
Tribunal)
1—have had only mixed results in promoting robust economic or political integration.  
Not surprisingly, many judges, lawyers, civil society groups, and commentators have either 
ignored the Andean Community or dismissed it as a failure. 
 
Yet the Andean integration project has had remarkable success within one area of its 
legal system—the rules governing the protection of intellectual property (IP).  Those rules are 
found in extensive and detailed supranational laws—officially known as “Decisions”—that 
regulate patents, trademarks, copyrights, and other IP subjects.  Andean IP Decisions have direct 
effect and serve as the national IP legislation in each of the member states, occasionally 
supplemented by domestic IP decrees promulgated by national executives.  Once adopted, 
Andean IP Decisions and domestic IP decrees are interpreted and applied by the ATJ, by national 
courts, and by IP administrative agencies in each of the member states.  The result, as we have 
explained elsewhere, is an effective rule of law island for IP, an island in which Andean legal 
rules—rather than power, political influence, or bribery—regulate the behavior and decision 
making of government officials and private firms (Helfer, Alter and Guerzovich, 2009).
2
   
 
 Two aspects of this rule of law island are especially noteworthy.  The first is the 
overwhelming dominance of IP cases on the docket of the Andean Tribunal.  Of the 1338 
preliminary references that national judges sent to the ATJ through the end of 2007, 1303 
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concern IP.
3
  The domestic origin of these rulings is also remarkably uniform: 1285 cases began 
as challenges to an administrative agency’s decision to grant or deny an application to register a 
trademark, patent, or other IP right.  This striking statistic reveals that IP agency registration 
decisions are responsible for nearly 96% of all ATJ preliminary rulings (Helfer and Alter, 2009).   
 
 The second important feature of this system is the balance that Andean Decisions strike 
between the interests of IP owners and those of consumers.  As we explain below, the Andean 
Tribunal and domestic administrative agencies have rebuffed multiple efforts to expand IP 
protection of pharmaceuticals to include pipeline patents, second use patents, and data 
protection.  As the case studies in this volume reveal, these actions have enabled Andean 
countries to maintain a balanced legal regime that limits the rights of private IP owners and 
expands the public’s access to medicines.   
 
Part I of this chapter explains how the repeated interactions between the IP administrative 
agencies and the ATJ helped to build an effective IP rule of law in Andean Community and to 
solidify pro-consumer interpretations of regional patent and trademark rules.  Part II documents 
how ATJ judges and agency officials enabled Andean governments to resist pressure from the 
United States and its pharmaceutical industry to expand patent rights in violation of express 
limits on IP protection required by Andean IP rules.  Part III evaluates the Andean Community’s 
relative success in balancing the interests of IP owners and consumers. Part III also considers the 
broader implications for access to medicines in Latin America, drawing on examples from the 
national case studies in this volume. 
 
 
I. Constructing a Balanced IP Rule of Law in the Andean Community: The 
Relationship Between the Andean Tribunal of Justice and Domestic IP Agencies  
 
Over the last two decades, a powerful symbiotic relationship developed between the ATJ 
and the domestic IP agencies in the Andean member states.
4
  Beginning in the early 1990s, the 
agencies received a growing number of applications to register trademarks and patents.  In 
reviewing those applications, officials identified gaps and ambiguities in Andean IP rules, and 
they actively sought the ATJ’s guidance to address them.  The agencies have helped to frame the 
legal questions that national courts later referred to the ATJ, they have participated in litigation 
before the Andean Tribunal, and they have provided information to ATJ judges to defend their 
registration decisions and substantive policy positions.  ATJ jurisprudence, in turn, has been 
influenced by national IP agencies’ broad subject matter competences—which include consumer 
protection, competition, and bankruptcy as well as IP—and a culture in which officials viewed 
themselves as engaged in highly skilled and technical activities. 
 
                                                            
3 Of these 1338 rulings, 1165 (87%) interpret Andean trademark laws; 103 (8%) involve Andean patent; 11 (1%) 
concern copyrights; and 24 (2%) concern other IP rights.  Only 35 cases (3%) concern other legal issues.   
4 This relationship was strongest in Peru and Colombia and somewhat less developed in Ecuador and Venezuela.  It 
was weakest in Bolivia, the least economically Andean Community member, which also has weaker judicial and 
administrative systems and limited IP-related foreign investment (Helfer, Alter and Guerzovich, 2009, at 22, 35-36). 
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When referrals reached the ATJ, its judges responded by issuing decisions that bolstered 
the agencies’ independence, transparency, and fidelity to the rule of law.  The Andean Tribunal 
recognized that agencies were not immune from political interference.  In response, it stressed 
the need for “administrative and economic autonomy to free officials from any kind of pressures 
or influences that derogate from” determining the interests of “the [IP] owner as well as the 
public or consumer.”5 
 
The ATJ also clarified and augmented the procedures that the agencies were to follow 
when reviewing patent and trademark applications.  For example, the ATJ emphasized that 
officials had a responsibility to exercise particular care when IP applications are contested, 
including an obligation to articulate reasons for rejecting an opposition and to provide sufficient 
facts and legal analysis to enable the parties to challenge registration decisions in court.  Taken 
together, these procedures helped to foster a hospitable climate for fair and evenhanded 
adjudication of IP registration disputes.
6
   
 
As the agencies revised their procedures in response to ATJ rulings, their officials also 
influenced the Andean Tribunal’s jurisprudence to reflect the officials’ desire for IP rules that 
balance the interests of consumers and those of IP owners.  In Peru, for example, the National 
Institute for Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property, better known by its 
Spanish acronym INDECOPI, included a division devoted to enforcing consumer protection laws 
and educating Peruvians about unlawful market practices.  The agency developed an internal 
culture that held consumer rights in high regard.  This culture also influenced the work of 
INDECOPI’s administrative tribunal, whose decisions reviewing patent and trademark 
registrations and denials were later appealed to national courts and then referred to the ATJ.  
Over time, the agency’s pro-consumer orientation influenced ATJ judges, preserving the public 
interest aspects of Andean IP rules (Helfer and Alter 2009, at 915-18).   
 
The foregoing discussion reveals how the registration decisions of domestic IP 
administrative agencies, appeals to national courts, and preliminary references to the ATJ 
generated a positive feedback mechanism that helped build an effective IP rule of law in the 
Andean Community.  Early ATJ rulings improved the agencies’ procedures, promoted reasoned 
decision making, clarified ambiguities in Andean IP rules, and helped to insulate officials from 
domestic political pressure.  The resulting climate of predictability and legal certainty 
encouraged firms to file an increasing number of applications for IP protection, notwithstanding 
the agencies’ pro-consumer orientation.  Many of these firms appealed the agencies’ registration 
decisions to national courts.  The judges on those courts, in turn, referred a growing number of 
cases to the ATJ, which further clarified Andean IP Decisions and administrative procedures.  
The cycle was completed when the Andean Tribunal’s case law was applied by the same 
agencies whose registration decisions had spawned the first wave of ATJ referrals. 
 
 
                                                            
5 Case 27–IP–95, at 15 (Oct. 25, 1996). 
6  See, e.g., Case 5–IP–99, at 6–8 (Oct. 25, 2000); Case 16–IP–2003, at 7 (Mar. 12, 2003); Case 44–IP–2006, at 10 
(May 3, 2006); see also Case 35–IP–98 (Oct. 30, 1998) (instructing the national judge to determine whether the 
administrative agency had appropriately justified its decision).  
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II.  Enforcing Andean IP Rules in Response to National Violations and Resisting 
Pressures for Stronger IP Protection of Pharmaceuticals 
 
The symbiotic relationship that developed between the ATJ judges and agency officials 
played a key role in three high-profile cases challenging domestic IP decrees as contrary to 
Andean law.  The cases concerned Andean rules that restricted IP rights—specifically, pipeline 
patents, second-use patents, and five years of exclusive protection for pharmaceutical test data—
to achieve public interest and public health goals.  The TRIPS Agreement does not require states 
to protect these rights.  As a result, commentators generally describe a government that denies 
such protections as exercising the “flexibilities” that TRIPS provides to tailor domestic IP laws 
to other policy goals.
7
  In the Andean Community, in contrast, these restrictions on IP rights 
were mandatory.  When adopting Andean IP Decisions, member states made a collective 
decision to capitalize on TRIPS’ flexibilities as a way to promote public health.  After these 
Decisions were adopted, however, the United States and U.S. pharmaceutical firms increasingly 
pressured individual countries to adopt stronger IP protection in violation of Andean law.  The 
ATJ provided a forum for opponents of these efforts to push back. 
 
In the pipeline patent case, decided in 1996, the ATJ invalidated a decree based on a 
bilateral IP agreement between Ecuador and the United States that extended the patent rights of 
foreign drug manufacturers.  In the second-use patent case of 2001, the ATJ overturned a 
Peruvian decree—adopted in response to pressure by the U.S. pharmaceutical giant Pfizer—that 
authorized domestic IP agencies to grant second-use patents—including the lucrative patent for 
Viagra—in contravention of Andean law.  And in the data protection case, decided in 2005, the 
ATJ found fault with a Colombian decree—adopted under pressure from the United States—that 
protects test data that pharmaceutical firms submit to the national health ministry when seeking 
approval to market new medicines.  In each case, the ATJ and the domestic IP agencies provided 
a bulwark against pressure from the United States and its pharmaceutical industry to provide 
stronger IP protection of pharmaceuticals than Andean IP Decisions allowed.   
 
A. Enforcing the Ban on Pipeline Patents  
 
In the early 1990s, as part of an effort to conform regional IP rules to the soon-to-be-
adopted TRIPS Agreement, Andean governments for the first time recognized the patentability 
of pharmaceutical products.  Aware that such protection would raise the price of medicines, the 
governments phased in protection incrementally.  They recognized patents for new drugs 
developed after a major overhaul of Andean IP rules in 1992.  But they refused to protect 
medicines patented in other countries during the years when it was impossible to apply for a 
pharmaceutical patent in any of the Andean countries.  Although many of these foreign drugs 
were in the production “pipeline” before the change in Andean law, the member states 
nevertheless refused to recognize them in reliance on a theory of “absolute novelty.”8 
                                                            
7 E.g. Musungu and Oh, 2005; Pires de Carvalho, 2010, at 62 (“The term ‘flexibilities’ means the alternative ways 
through which TRIPS obligations can be transposed into national law so that national interests are accommodated 
and yet TRIPS provisions and principles are complied with.”). 
8 The doctrine of absolute novelty “implies that for an invention to be new and not to be included in the state of the 
art [and thus eligible for patent protection], it must . . . be known neither within the country where the patent is being 
sought, nor in any other country” (Manrique 1998).   
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The United States, adopting the legal position of pharmaceutical firms, pressured the 
Andean countries to protect preexisting patented drugs.  Most Andean states resisted this 
pressure.  In 1993, however, Ecuador and the United States signed a bilateral treaty that 
mandated pipeline protection.  Ecuador’s legislature never ratified the treaty, but the country’s 
president adopted a decree to implement it domestically.  Relying on this decree, over the next 
two years the Ecuadoran IP agency awarded twenty-three pipeline patents to foreign 
pharmaceutical manufacturers such as Pfizer and Novartis. 
 
In response, domestic generic drug producers successfully lobbied lawyers at the Andean 
General Secretariat to file a noncompliance suit against Ecuador alleging that the pipeline decree 
violated the absolute novelty requirement Andean Decision 344, which regulated patents and 
trademarks.  Ecuador defended the domestic decree as consistent with a provision of the 
Decision authorizing members to adopt domestic legislation or international agreements that 
“strengthen the industrial property rights” (Andean Decision 344, Article 143 (1993)).  The 
General Secretariat countered that the decree contradicted an unambiguous restriction in Andean 
patent rules and created an incentive for foreign firms to seek pharmaceutical patents in Ecuador 
but not in other member states.  In a judgment issued in 1996, the ATJ sided with the Secretariat.  
The Tribunal interpreted the word “strengthen” in a teleological fashion, reasoning that national 
laws and treaties must complement the regional IP system, not contradict it.  Ecuador had thus 
violated Andean IP law “by establishing an exceptional regime . . . granting advantages to 
patenting in its own country, in a manner that was unfair under the common regime applied in 
the other Andean countries” (Manrique, 1998, at 217).  The ATK also categorically rejected 
Ecuador’s claim that “an international commitment [could] be invoked as a reason to validate 
noncompliance with a prior Community obligation” (Case 1–AI–96 (Oct. 30, 1996), at 30). 
 
Within weeks of the ruling, the President of Ecuador adopted a decree revoking the prior 
law.  Relying on the new decree, the domestic IP agency rejected at least 120 pending 
applications from foreign firms seeking to register pipeline patents (Helfer, Alter and 
Guerzovich, 2009, at 27).  When the firms challenged the agency’s denials, national courts 
referred the cases to the ATJ.  The Andean Tribunal supported the agencies, reaffirmed its prior 
ruling, and stated categorically that “[a]ny patent requested on the basis of the pipeline principle 
must be denied or, if granted, nullified” Case 25–IP–2002, at 18 (May 8, 2002).  Since the ATJ’s 
1996 judgment, the Ecuadoran IP agency has not granted any additional pipeline patents, and nor 
have the IP agencies in the other four member countries.  The agencies thus played a key role in 
enforcing an important flexibility provision in Andean IP law. 
 
B. Enforcing the Ban on Second-Use Patents 
 
Andean IP Decisions contain a second flexibility provision relating to access to 
medicines—a prohibition on second-use patents.9  This ban was contested by the American 
pharmaceutical company Pfizer, which filed second-use patent applications in all Andean 
countries after discovering, in the mid-1990s, that its heart medication pyrazolpyrimidinones 
                                                            
9 Andean IP law categorically reject second-use patents:  “Products or processes already patented and included in the 
state of the art . . . may not be the subject of new patents on the sole ground [that the product was] put to a use 
different from that originally contemplated by the initial patent.”  Decision 486, Article 21; Decision 344, Article 16. 
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(Viagra) had the side effect of treating male impotence.  In Peru, INDECOPI applied Andean IP 
law and rejected the company’s application.  A few months later, President Alberto Fujimori 
issued a decree recognizing second-use patents in direct contravention of Andean law.  Pfizer 
then asked INDECOPI to reexamine its patent applications.  Relying on the new decree, the 
agency granted the applications.  Pfizer then threatened to sue Peruvian firms that were 
manufacturing or selling generic versions of Viagra.  
 
With domestic litigation looming, the Association of Pharmaceutical Industries of 
National Origin (ADIFAN), a trade association of generic drug firms, filed a complaint with the 
Andean General Secretariat.  The Secretariat upheld the complaint and submitted the case to the 
ATJ.  In a 2001 judgment, the Tribunal agreed with the generics companies that Fujimori’s 
decree violated the ban on second-use patents in Andean law, and it directed Peru “to leave 
without effect the patent granted to” Pfizer (Case 89–AI–2000, at 40).  ADIFAN then petitioned 
INDECOPI to revoke the patent for Viagra, and the agency did so several months later.  Peru 
never repealed the domestic decree, but neither did it pressure INDECOPI to enforce it.  This 
suggests that the government was willing to circumvent Andean law but unwilling to challenge 
agency officials or the ATJ on behalf of Pfizer—actions that would have involved a more serious 
challenge to the Andean legal system.  Since the Viagra case, INDECOPI has not granted any 
second-use patents. 
 
Litigation in Venezuela and Ecuador followed a similar pattern.  The IP agency in each 
county registered a second-use patent for Viagra prior to the ATJ ruling against Peru, and 
national associations of generic drug companies turned to the Andean legal system to challenge 
the registrations.  When the General Secretariat and the ATJ reaffirmed their prior rulings, the 
agencies reversed their positions and invalidated the patents.
10
  In Colombia, the IP agency was 
bolder—it rejected Pfizer’s application.  The company then appealed to a national court, which 
referred the case to the ATJ for a preliminary ruling.  The Tribunal reiterated the ban on second 
use patents and the court implemented the ATJ’s decision (El Tiempo, 2009). 
 
As a result of this wave of litigation, all of the domestic IP agencies in the Andean 
Community denied or annulled patents for Viagra.  This region-wide refusal to recognize 
second-use patents remains a major irritant to the U.S. pharmaceutical firms.  The industry’s 
2008 Special 301 Report to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative places the blame 
squarely on the ATJ.  The report criticized the Tribunal for “issu[ing] several legal opinions . . . 
forcing Andean Community members to refuse recognition of patents for second uses[.]  The 
[ATJ] position is dispositive on the issue and no further domestic appeals/remedies are possible” 
(PhRMA, 2008, at 236). 
 
C. The Politics of Data Protection and the Reversal of an ATJ Ruling  
 
The third Andean IP noncompliance dispute concerns the test data that drug companies 
submit to domestic health ministries when seeking approval to market new medicines.  The 
pharmaceutical industry favors laws that give patent owners the exclusive right to control such 
                                                            
10 Case 01–AI–2001, at 39 (June 27, 2002) (judgment against Venezuela); Case 34–AI–2001, at 51–52 (Aug. 21, 
2002) (judgment against Ecuador); see also Pacheco and Nebrada, 2006. 
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data.  Absent such protection, the industry claims, competitors can unfairly rely on the drug 
companies’ data without conducting their own safety tests. 
 
Disputes over data protection in the Andean Community have a long history.  Decision 
344, adopted in 1993, prohibited the disclosure of unpublished test data—a form of legal 
protection mandated by TRIPS.
11
  But the Decision also made this protection exclusive for five 
years; in contrast, TRIPS did not mandate a specific term of protection, requiring only that the 
data should not be put to “unfair commercial use.”12  Some Andean governments interpreted this 
language as permitting a shorter period of protection.  During negotiations to revise Decision 
344, the issue sharply divided the member states.  The region was home to a large generics 
industry, which would benefit from less stringent protection of test data.  But the United States 
and U.S. pharmaceutical firms were pressuring Andean countries to maintain the five-year period 
of data exclusivity and include it in a draft U.S.-Andean trade agreement.  In the end, the new 
Andean legislation—Decision 486, adopted in 2000—removed the reference to a five-year term 
of exclusivity and instead simply required protection of test data “against any unfair commercial 
use.”  The key provision of Decision 486 also added an ambiguous final sentence allowing 
member states to “take the necessary action to guarantee the protection provided for in this 
article.”13 
 
Relying on this provision, in 2002 Colombia enacted a domestic decree that granted up to 
five years of exclusive protection for test data.  The Association of Colombian Pharmaceutical 
Industries (ASINFAR) promptly challenged the decree, but the General Secretariat upheld the 
law as permitted under the above-quoted sentence.  ASINFAR appealed to the ATJ, which 
rejected the Secretariat’s interpretation—a first in IP litigation before the Andean Tribunal—and 
held that the Colombian decree violated Decision 486.  The judges reasoned that data protection 
must be interpreted in light of the Andean Community’s interest in promoting public health, 
interests that precluded Colombia from enacting data protection rules that deviated from the 
regional standard.
14
 
 
The ATJ’s ruling had immediate consequences for the ongoing free trade talks with the 
United States.  Andean governments made clear to their American counterparts that a five-year 
period of exclusivity was now “off the table.”  In an effort to save the decree and the 
negotiations, the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Trade asked the other member states to clarify 
that the country’s 2002 decree was consistent with Andean Decision 486.  All prior Decisions 
had been approved by consensus, but on this issue the governments were deadlocked.  After 
                                                            
11 Andean Decision 344, Articles 78 & 79.  Article 79 provides:  
No one other than the person who has supplied the data referred to in [Article 78] may, without the 
latter’s authorization, invoke that data in support of an application for the approval of a product 
during a period of not less than five years following the date on which the Member Country 
granted approval for the marketing of the product to the person who produced the data. 
12 TRIPS, Article 39.3. 
13 Andean Decision 486, Article 266. 
14 Case 114–AI–2004, at 41 (Dec. 8, 2005) (“[T]he Community interest that must regulate the marketing of 
pharmaceutical products . . . is directed to the protection of public health and the improvement of the standard of 
living of the inhabitants of the subregion.”). 
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several attempts to reach agreement failed, the Andean Commission (a body comprised of 
executive branch officials from each member country) scheduled a meeting for April 2006.  
Bolivia and Venezuela were unable to vote at that meeting because they had not paid their 
membership dues.  In their absence, the remaining three states adopted Andean Decision 632 by 
consensus.  The Decision “clarifies the intent of the legislators . . . that each Member Country 
shall have the authority to choose the means for protecting test data, including the possibility of 
establishing time periods” of exclusive protection—a retroactive validation of the Colombian 
decree (Decision 632, 2006, preamble). 
 
This resolution of the data protection dispute exacerbated an already tense political 
climate in the Andes.  Regional trade negotiations broke down in late 2005 when Peru and 
Colombia agreed to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with the United States that require a five 
years of test data exclusivity.  In contrast, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela do not provide for 
such protection, nor have they entered into bilateral trade agreements with the United States.  
These divisions triggered Venezuela’s withdrawal from the Andean Community two weeks after 
the adoption of Decision 632.  “President Chavez stated publicly that the reason for the 
withdrawal was the entry of other member countries into free trade agreements with the United 
States . . . ” (USTR, 2007 at 621).  Officials in Colombia’s foreign trade ministry concurred, but 
characterized Decision 632 as the “last straw” in precipitating Venezuela’s break with the 
regional integration pact.
15
 
 
* * * * * * * 
 
Two common threads tie together the pipeline patent, second-use patent, and data 
protection cases.  First, rulings by the ATJ made it more difficult for individual member 
countries to defect from Andean Community IP policies in response to demands for stronger IP 
protection of pharmaceuticals by the United States and U.S. firms.  In the pipeline and second-
use cases, national judges and agency officials initially followed domestic decrees that benefitted 
U.S. drug companies but violated Andean IP Decisions.  These actors changed course, however, 
after the ATJ invalidated the decrees and ordered the agencies to overturn patents registered 
based on the decrees.  National governments acquiesced in these reversals, even though the 
conflicting degrees nominally remained on the books.  The outcome of the third case—data 
protection—was more equivocal.  Colombia argued that the ATJ had erroneously interpreted an 
ambiguity in Andean IP law.  Rather than openly defy the Andean Tribunal’s ruling, however, 
Colombia orchestrated the adoption of a new Decision (one that permits but does not require data 
exclusivity) using a procedure in Andean law for states to interpret regional legislation. 
 
Second, domestic IP agencies were important behind-the-scenes actors in all three cases.  
The agencies had a stake in Andean IP laws, a stake that the Andean General Secretariat nurtured 
in the late 1990s during the drafting of Decision 486.  The General Secretariat consulted agency 
officials to ensure that the new IP legislation rectified concerns and closed lacunae in the prior 
regional IP law—Decision 344, adopted in 1994 (Helfer, Alter and Guerzovich, at 12-13).  
Having contributed to the content of Andean IP Decisions, the agencies had an interest in 
upholding them.  When governments tried to circumvent the Decisions, agencies were put in a 
                                                            
15 Interviews at the Colombia Ministry of Trade, Industry and Tourism, Bogotá (Sept. 14, 2007). 
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difficult position.  They could not ignore legally valid domestic decrees.  But they also 
recognized that Andean IP law—“their” law—was being sidestepped in ways that could undercut 
low-cost access to medicines.  The ATJ may have been willing to push back against the decrees 
because it knew that agency officials would support its rulings.  The symbiotic relationship 
between the ATJ and the agencies can be summed up as follows:  domestic IP agencies are 
committed to following Andean IP Decisions as interpreted by the Andean Tribunal.  This 
commitment, in turn, has enabled the ATJ to hold governments to regional IP standards. 
 
The cooperative relationship between Andean judges and administrative agencies helped 
the ATJ to enforce pro-consumer Andean IP rules in the three cases discussed in this section.  
Nevertheless, the United States and its pharmaceutical industry have continued to pressure 
governments in Latin America to provide stronger IP protection for new medicines.  Such 
pressure is unrelenting, and over time the United States has won important concessions, 
principally through the negotiation of bilateral trade treaties containing TRIPS-plus standards.  
The bilateral free trade agreements with Colombia and Peru are notable examples.
16
  For these 
three issues, however, Andean countries have been more successful than their neighbors in 
maintaining key elements of a more balanced approach to IP, one that seeks to reconcile the 
social and economic needs of developing countries with the interests of private rights holders. 
 
 
III. Lessons of the Andean Experience for Access to Medicines in Latin America 
 
The experience of the Andean Community, summarized above, offers four insights for 
understanding the relationship of IP and access to medicines in Latin America.  First, it 
highlights the importance of examining how international IP norms are incorporated into national 
legal systems.  Second, the Andean experience foregrounds the role of administrative agencies in 
shaping whether patents and data protection are barriers to access to medicines.  The third lesson 
relates to whether local generics industries can effectively advance broader public interest goals 
relating to the human right to health.  The final insight highlights the wider administrative and 
regulatory contexts in which Andean IP rules are embedded.  
 
A. Domesticating International IP Norms 
 
Most studies of the relationship between IP protection and access to medicines focus on 
international instruments such as the TRIPS Agreement, TRIPS-plus treaties, the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, and emerging treaties, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (Ho, 2011; Pogge, Rimmer and Rubenstein, 2010; Yamane, 2011).  These 
studies closely analyze these international instruments to identify the flexibilities they contain 
and the policy discretion they afford to governments.  The studies give less attention, however, to 
how international IP instruments are incorporated into national legal systems.  They mainly focus 
on high-profile issues, such as compulsory licenses, or on economically important developing 
                                                            
16 Bilateral treaties are also driving IP lawmaking in the Andean Community.  The most recent Andean IP 
legislation, Decision 689, adopted in August 2008, gives individual member states greater leeway to strengthen 
domestic IP protection rules.  Colombia and Peru lobbied for the Decision to enable them to comply with their 
respective bilateral treaties with the United States (Barreda, 2008; Kelechava, 2008). 
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nations, most notably Brazil (Bird and Cahoy, 2008), India (Kapczynski, 2009), South Africa 
(Forman, 2008; Klug, 2008), and Thailand (Ho, 2009).
17
   
 
Our studies of the Andean legal system add to this literature in two important respects.  
First, unlike the countries listed above, the national IP legislation of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and (until 2006) Venezuela is Andean law—law that is negotiated at the supranational level 
and has direct domestic effect.  Domestic IP administrative agencies across the region apply 
these supranational rules to determine whether to register patents and trademarks, the agencies 
exchange best practices when they confront unclear aspects of the law, and governments ask for 
the agencies’ views when revising supranational IP rules.  These features give agency officials a 
stake in ensuring that Andean IP Decisions are respected.   
 
Second, Andean governments decided to incorporate TRIPS flexibilities as obligatory 
features of Andean law to promote public health goals and encourage local generics industries.  
This approach differs from other Latin American countries, which view the flexibilities as 
helpful—but not mandatory—instruments of state policy.  As a result, these countries have often 
succumbed to U.S. pressure to recognize pipeline and second-use patents and to provide a multi-
year term of protection for pharmaceutical test data (Helfer, Alter and Guerzovich, 2009, at 28, 
30, 34).  For example, Brazil is among the most aggressive countries in Latin America in 
threatening and invoking TRIPS flexibilities such as local working requirements and compulsory 
licenses. Yet Brazil also recognizes pipeline patents for pharmaceuticals, even though it has not 
ratified any TRIPS-plus treaties that require such protection and notwithstanding trenchant 
critiques of pipeline protection by commentators (Giuse, 2010).   
 
In the Andes, the existence of a supranational venue for IP lawmaking helped to ensure 
that TRIPS flexibilities were given effect.  Generic drug companies worked with the General 
Secretariat to protect their interests, and the Secretariat ensures that Andean IP rules took into 
account consumer interests.  We are uncertain why the actors discussed in the other chapters in 
this volume—such as national judges and civil society groups—have had less influence in 
shaping the balance between IP protection and access to medicines in other countries.  We 
suggest that one answer may be the absence of a supranational legal system whose competence 
includes IP issues.  All of the actors we interviewed in the Andes—agency administrators, 
lawyers, generic drug producers, and Andean officials—indicated that national judges were 
generally uninformed about IP law.  They also expressed a preference for balancing patent 
protection, consumer rights, and access to medicine at the supranational rather than the national 
level—a possibility that does not exist elsewhere in South America.   
 
B. The Underappreciated Role of Domestic Administrative Agencies 
 
Scholars of IP and human rights have long recognized the importance of national courts 
in interpreting and applying international law (Benvenisti 2008; Dinwoodie, 2000; Helfer and 
Slaughter 1997).  Courts can construe domestic laws in harmony with treaty obligations, they can 
adapt international norms to national values, and they can serve as compliance partners for the 
                                                            
17 Far fewer studies (e.g., Bernieri, 2006; Kunisawa, 2009; Shadlen, 2011; Shadlen, 2009) have addressed the 
relationship between IP and access to medicines in Latin America. 
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rulings of international tribunals.  Only recently, however, have commentators given equal 
attention to the analogous functions performed by domestic administrative agencies.  Peter 
Drahos’ comprehensive comparison of national patent offices is a prominent recent example, as 
are analyses of national human rights institutions (Drahos, 2010; Mertus, 2009; Murray, 2007).  
 
Our research reveals that administrative agencies are more important compliance partners 
than national courts in ensuring implementation of Andean IP rules and in balancing IP against 
other priorities.  One reason is that the IP agencies in Colombia and Peru are also charged with 
protecting consumers and policing markets.  Another is the history of Andean IP policy, which 
had long required only minimal patent protection for pharmaceuticals as a strategy to promote 
public health and nurture local generics industries.  Governments changed course in the 1990s 
when they adopted TRIPS-compatible IP rules for new drugs.  But the memory of IP as an tool 
of social policy lived on and was carried forward by administrative agency officials as they 
implemented Andean rules governing IP, consumer protection, and competition law. 
 
The contributions to this volume highlight other ways in which administrative agencies 
are important to IP implementation politics.  The first example concerns the authority of Brazil’s 
National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA) to review applications for pharmaceutical 
patents previously considered by the country’s National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI).  
This dual review mechanism promotes the rigorous examination of patent applications and 
prevents the granting of drug patents that have adverse public health consequences.
18
  But this 
shared competence has also engendered competition between the agencies and constitutional 
challenges from the pharmaceutical industry, challenges that now appear to have succeeded.  The 
second example relates to the patent “linkage” mechanism that prevents national health 
ministries from approving generic medicines for distribution without first confirming that active 
ingredients are not protected by a patent.
19
  As a result of the linkage requirement, “drug 
regulatory offices are mandated to ensure that products they license are in full compliance with 
IP law,” a task they “are neither trained nor funded to do.”20   
 
C. Generics Industries and the Public Interest 
 
Another theme that connects the case studies to our analysis of the Andean Community is 
the prominent role of generic drug companies and industry associations.  In the Andean context, 
these companies and associations had powerful financial incentives to oppose domestic IP 
decrees that make it more difficult to distribute cheaper copies of patented medicines.  In 
lawsuits challenging these decrees, representatives of the generics industry raised a variety of 
legal arguments, including not only the violation of Andean IP Decisions but also the 
contravention of consumer protection principles and the human right to health.   
 
                                                            
18 Mônica Steffen Guise and Adelina de Oliveira Novaes 
19 Salvador Millaleo 
20 The United States has included linkage requirements in TRIPS-plus treaties adopted by several countries in Latin 
America.  Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, CAFTA, Intellectual Property, and the Right to Health in Central America 
___, ___.  
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So long as the generics industry focused its opposition on TRIPS-plus patents, its private 
interests more or less aligned with the broader public interest.  As the contributions to this 
volume reveal, however, such an alignment cannot be taken for granted.  Generics companies 
have not shied away from asserting IP rights to gain or preserve market share or otherwise 
advance their commercial interests.  The prevalence of branded generics in Argentina, with 
prices that exceed those of their proprietary cognates, is a prominent illustration.
21
  Public 
interest civil society groups have recognized that the generics industry does not always act as 
proxy for efforts to expand access to medicines.  As result, these organizations have, with 
considerable success, challenged the lack of access as a violation of the rights to life and health 
guaranteed in national constitutions
22
 and in the American Convention on Human Rights.
23
  
 
D. Situating the Andean Experience in a Wider Context 
 
Our research reveals how the Andean Tribunal, domestic administrative agencies, and 
generic drug companies contributed to building an IP rule of law in the Andean Community that 
balanced IP rights against public health goals.  Our interviews with these actors also suggest a 
somewhat less hopeful prediction for future efforts to expand access to medicines in Latin 
America.   
 
First, it is worth recalling that prior to the early 1990s, Andean IP law, like that of most 
developing countries, did not provide any patent protection for pharmaceutical products.  Seen 
from this vantage point, “absolute novelty”—the legal doctrine that underpins Andean law’s ban 
on pipeline and second-use patents—was a major concession by proponents of access to 
medicines.  For domestic IP agencies, however, this concession was uncontroversial.  
Governments created the agencies in the 1990s when they they revised Andean IP rules.  They 
staffed the agencies with pro-reform economists, lawyers and administrators, many of whom had 
foreign training or work experience.  These officials accepted a global IP regime as a given.  But 
they also prioritized the development of balanced rules that would help local actors—both 
businesses and consumers—to capture the benefits of IP protection.24  Although opinions 
differed over where to strike the balance, all of the participants we interviewed recognized the 
advantages of developing Andean-wide IP legislation.  For access to medicines advocates, such 
legislation helped national actors resist foreign pressures to circumvent legal doctrines such as 
                                                            
21 See Paola Bergallo and Agustina Ramón Michel, The Recursivity of Global Lawmaking in the Fight for an 
Argentine Policy on Drug Patents ___, ___  
22 For example, many high courts in Latin America, including in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Peru, and 
Venezuela have recognized a right of patients with HIV/AIDS to medical treatment, including anti-retroviral 
medications, under their national constitutions (Oquendo, 2008; Yamin and Parra-Vera 2009). 
23 In Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al v. El Salvador, Case 12.249, Report No. 29/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 Doc. 20 
rev. at 284 (2000), for example, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found admissible a claim that El 
Salvador had violated the right to life, health and wellbeing of HIV/AIDS patients by failing to provide them with 
triple therapy medication.  While the claim was pending the government approved provision of anti-retroviral 
therapy for persons with HIV or AIDS, and the case ended in a friendly settlement. 
24 The IP agencies also helped local firms and entrepreneurs secure trademark protection for their goods and 
services.  The agencies worked hard to make the trademark registration process affordable and relatively simple for 
small businesses without the need for legal assistance.  The result has been a rapid rise in local demand for 
trademarks and an increase in trademark oppositions (Helfer, Alter and Guerzovich, 2009, at 18-19). 
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absolute novelty.  For businesses seeking to market products in multiple countries, common 
regional standards were preferable to disparate national standards.   
 
Second, our focus on the substantive content of Andean IP Decisions omits other 
factors—such as changes in industry regulations—that may also affect access to medicines.  One 
anecdote from our interviews is illustrative.  According to the President of the Colombian 
generics manufacturers association ASINFAR, the number of laboratories producing medicines 
in that country declined from more than 275 in 1995 to just over 100 at the end of 2000.  The 
President identified two causes of this decline.  First, new production standards required 
investments that were too onerous for many local producers to meet, and these producers simply 
went out of business.  Second, for multinational drug companies, the new standards—together 
with liberalized access to the Colombian market—made drug production in other countries 
economically attractive.  ASINFAR’s President estimated that, by 2007, ninety percent of all 
pharmaceuticals distributed in Colombia were produced elsewhere.
25
  These changes highlight 
the importance of considering how the broader regulatory environment intersects with 
substantive IP rules to influence the scope of access to medicines.   
 
 
Conclusion  
 
IP protection and access to medicines are in an uneasy and often contested relationship in 
Latin America.  In the Andean Community, an alliance between domestic IP administrative 
agencies and the Andean Tribunal enabled governments to resist pressures from the United 
States and foreign pharmaceutical firms to circumvent Andean IP rules that facilitated access to 
medicines.  This alliance was at its zenith from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, a decade during 
which generic drug companies repeatedly and successfully challenged domestic degrees that 
expanded IP protection of pharmaceuticals.  More recently, political and economic fractures 
among Andean Community member states have hampered regional cooperation efforts and 
enabled the United States to negotiate TRIPS-plus agreements with Colombia and Peru.  Even 
so, Andean IP law retains restrictions on IP—such as a ban on pipeline and second-use patents—
that many other Latin American nations abrogated in response to foreign pressures.  The Andean 
Community’s experience thus provides important insights for governments, civil society groups, 
and individuals seeking to expand access to medicines throughout the region. 
 
                                                            
25 Interview with the President of the Associación de Industrias Farmacéuticas Colombianas (ASINFAR), Sept. 14, 
2007. 
